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This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. I develop a model
in which firms and workers may agree to report less than the true amount of earnings to the fiscalauthorities. I show that
introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings and induces higher compliance by some
agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption before and after the massive minimum
wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households who appear to benefit from it actually experienced a
drop compared to similar but unaffected household, thus supporting the prediction of the theory.
JEL Classification: J38, H24, H26, H32.
Keywords: MinimumWage, Tax Evasion, Hungary.
A tanulmány a minimálbér-szabályozás és a munkavállalók adóelkerülése közötti kapcsolatot vizsgálja. Ehhez egy olyan mo-
dellt állítok fel, amelyben a vállalatok és alkalmazottaik közös érdeke, hogy a tényleges jövedelemnél alacsonyabb összeget je-
lentsenek be az adóhatóságnál. A modell segítségével bemutatom, hogy a bejelentett jövedelmek eloszlása a minimálbér kör-
nyékén kicsúcsosodik. A minimálbér hatására egyes munkavállalók jövedelmük magasabb hányadát vallják be, ezáltal azonban
rendelkezésre álló jövedelmük csökken. A 2001-es magyarországi minimálbéremelés elõtti és utáni élelmiszerfogyasztás össze-
hasonlítása során kiderül, hogy azok a háztartások, amelyeket a minimálbéremelés pozitívan kellett volna, hogy érintsen, a
nem érintett háztartásokhoz képest csökkentették fogyasztásukat. Ez a megfigyelés konzisztens a modell redikciójával.
Abstract
Összefoglalás1 Introduction
"Did you know that more than half of the people nominally employed at the minimum wage earn more,
and the only reason for such a declaration is to evade taxes and social security contributions? 1"
(Advertisement in Metro newspaper for the Hungarian government Green Book, 22 September 2006)
What are the ﬁscal implications of introducing or increasing the minimum wage? What is its impact on dis-
posable income? This paper contributes to answering these questions by examining the interaction between
minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor.
I build a simple model in which workers and ﬁrms may agree to report less than the true amount of the
worker’s earnings to the ﬁscal authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social security contributions.
The minimum wage poses a constraint on this decision and, in this way, has an effect on compliance with
ﬁscal regulation. In particular, when a minimum wage is introduced or increased, some worker-ﬁrm pairs
prefer to increase their compliance than to decrease it by going completely underground. Thus, a spike in
the distribution of declared earnings appears at the minimum wage level. Moreover, workers who appear
to receive a higher wage, actually experience a drop in their disposable income, as they are forced to swap
undeclared earnings for declared, and taxable, ones. The massive increase in the minimum wage that took
place in Hungary in 2001 provides a quasi experiment to test this prediction of the model. Hungary is
a country where, like in many other developing and transition countries, underreporting of earnings is
widespread. I use panels derived from the household budget survey for the years 1999-2001 to compare the
dynamics of food consumption, as a proxy for true income, for households that appear to beneﬁt from the
minimum wage hike, the treatment group, and for similar but unaffected households, the control group. The
analysis consistently shows across different speciﬁcations that the treated households experienced a drop in
consumption compared to households in the control group, thus supporting the prediction of the theory.
Instead, the dynamics of food consumption experienced by the treatment and the control groups in the
pre-policy period did not differ, thus validating the control group.
Undeclaredworkisaseriousissueinmanycountries. Itisdifﬁculttoobtainreliabledataonitsextension, but
raw estimates indicate that the phenomenon is relevant, particularly in transition and developing countries.
In a recent report by Eurostat (2007), based on a representative survey of individuals in the European Union,
5% of all dependent employees admitted having received all or part of their salary as envelope wages within
the past 12 months. The country with the highest incidence is Romania, with a share of 23%, followed by
Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Lithuania, all with a double digit share, with Estonia and Hungary just below.
In Russia, 8% of the employees reported that they received part of their income "under the table" (Petrova,
2005). The phenomenon is not limited to Central and Eastern European economies. OECD estimates a 30%
shortfall in social security contributions due to undeclared work for Hungary, Mexico and South Korea, and
a shortfall above 20% for Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey (OECD, 2004a). In Turkey, ﬁrms belonging to
the formal sector are estimated to underreport 28% of their wage bill and for around 50% of the employees
enrolled in the Social Security Organization, the wages reported by employers are at the minimum insurable
level(WorldBank, 2006). AccordingtotheWorldBank, "inArgentina, roughly15percentofworkersreceive
paypartlyonthebooksandpartlyoffthebooks"(WorldBank, 2007). AWorldBankstudyonlabormarkets
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (World Bank, 2005) notices how in several countries in the
region, "disproportionately high shares of workers cluster on declared wages at or just above the minimum
wage (with evidence of additional undeclared incomes above the minimum), creating incentives to sustain a
high minimum wage to sustain tax revenue" and calls for further research on this aspect of minimum wage
policy. This is indeed the aim of this paper.
1 "Tudta, hogy a papíron minimálbérért dolgozók több mint fele többet keres annál, és csak azért van minimálbérre bejelentve, hogy kikerülje az adó- és
járulékﬁzetést?" (own translation).
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This work can be seen as integrating two strands of literature. The literature on the minimum wage is very
rich and informs a lively policy debate, mainly focusing on the effects on employment 2. Recently, several
empirical studies have considered the impact of the minimum wage on other aspects than employment,
like fringe beneﬁts (Simon and Kaestner, 2004), prices (Lemos, forthcoming), proﬁts (Draca et al., 2006),
reservation wages (Falk et al., 2004). This paper highlights another aspect of minimum wage policy that has
not been considered so far and shows how the minimum wage affects workers and ﬁrms through the "ﬁscal
channel"3. The literature on minimum wage also deals extensively with its effects on the wage distribution.
A spike at the minimum wage level has been observed in several instances (see, for instance, DiNardo et al.,
1996, Dickens and Manning, 2004). Such a spike has been deﬁned as a "puzzle" for several standard types of
labor market models (Brown, 1999) and as an "anomalous ﬁnding from the standpoint of the standard model
ofthelowwagelabormarket"(CardandKrueger,1995,p. 152). Proposedrationalizationsincludereductions
in non-wage compensation or increases in required effort to offset a binding minimum wage, ﬂatter earnings
proﬁles and adjustments in the amounts of hours worked. The model presented here proposes an alternative
rationale for the observed spike in a perfect competition framework with perfect elasticity of substitution
betweenlabortypesand, inrelatedwork(Tonin, 2007), Ipresentsomecross-countryevidencesuggestingthat
the mechanism analyzed here indeed contributes to shape the observed distribution of earnings in Europe.
The second strand of literature that this paper addresses deals with the theoretical and empirical study of
tax evasion and the shadow economy4. The literature on tax evasion has mainly been focused on personal
income tax and the compliance decision by an individual ﬁlling the tax declaration form. However, due to
the tax withholding and information reporting systems present in many countries, this is not an accurate
description for the case of employed labor. Indeed, the rate of non-compliance for wages and salaries at the
stage of ﬁlling the tax declaration form is often negligible. For instance, Klepper and Nagin (1989) report
a mere 0.1% of non-compliance for wages and salaries at this stage in the US, i.e. lower than for any other
income category. Therefore, to study tax evasion by employed labor it is necessary to take the interaction
between the employer and the employee into account5. Here I model the interaction by developing a novel
and simple model of tax evasion based on the plausible assumption that tax authorities possess an imperfect
detection technology. On the empirical side, this paper contributes to the methodology pioneered by Pis-
sarides and Weber (1989) to study underreporting by using income and consumption data from household
budget surveys. Pissarides and Weber (1989) study underreporting by self-employed in the UK by assuming
expenditure on food to be correctly reported by all income groups, while income is correctly reported by
employees, but underreported by the self-employed. Instead of food consumption, Feldman and Slemrod
(2007) use charitable cash contributions in unaudited tax returns. They estimate the relationship between
charitable contributions and reported income, depending on the source of income, and attribute to under-
reporting the fact that the propensity to make a contribution is higher out of self-employment income than
out of wages and salaries. This methodology has also been used to study underreporting by private sector
employees, using public sector employees as a control group assumed to correctly report income (Besim and
Jenkins, 2005). However, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007) take the opposite view in their study on
bribery in Ukraine. They use the large estimated sectorial gap in reported earnings between the public and
the private sector and the absence of an expenditure gap to identify the size of unreported bribes to public
ofﬁcials. A weakness of the approach used in this literature is indeed the need to identify a group that is not
evading. An advantage of the approach used in this paper is that it does not need to assume that a group
truthfully reports income. The minimum wage hike represents a shock to the "underreporting technology"
2 See Brown (1999) for a review.
3 A related paper is McIntyre (2006), who uses Brazilian data and focuses on estimating the cost associated with evasion and ﬁnds, in line with the
assumption in this paper, that there is no ﬁxed cost of evading, while the marginal cost equals 8.1% of the distance from the legal requirement.
4 See Andreoni et al. (1998) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys on tax evasion and Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey on the shadow
economy.
5 The study of tax evasion by employed labor is of particular interest as the ﬁscal imposition on labor in the form of social security contributions (SSC)
and personal income tax (PIT) represents the bulk of ﬁscal revenues in many countries, for instance labor taxes are the largest source of tax revenue
in the EU-25, representing around half of total tax receipts (Eurostat, 2006).
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affecting some workers but not others and this variation is exploited to identify the impact of the minimum
wage on underreporting. In their recent paper on tax evasion in Russia, Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez
and Sabirianova (forthcoming) employ a similar methodology, looking at the impact of the ﬂat tax reform of
2001.
The next section introduces the model. In section 3, the various effects of the minimum wage are explored.
The following section tests the implication of the model for disposable income by using Hungarian micro-
data. The last section concludes.
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The size of the population is exogenously given and normalized to 1. Every individual is characterized by a
productivity yi, distributedinthepopulationaccordingtopdf g(y)andcdfG(y)onthesupport[y
¯
, ¯ y], where
y
¯
 0. The labor market is competitive, each ﬁrm employs one worker, there is no capital, and production
is equal to labor input. Moreover, there is free entry of ﬁrms, ﬁrms can observe workers’ productivity, and
workers can move from one ﬁrm to another at no cost.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected proﬁts. In an environment without tax evasion, proﬁts for a
ﬁrm employing a worker with productivity yi are given by
i = yi  wi,
where wi is the gross wage6. Firms have an obligation to withhold taxes and social security contributions and
transfer them to the ﬁscal authorities. Taxation is at the proportional rate t 2 (0,1). Workers are risk-averse,
their (indirect) utility is an increasing function of net income, given by
Ii = wi(1  t).
The wedge between the gross wage paid by the ﬁrm and the net wage received by the worker, twi, is paid to
the ﬁscal authorities. Free entry of ﬁrms implies that in equilibrium, the expected proﬁts are zero which, in
turn, in the full compliance case implies that a worker with productivity yi would receive a gross wage yi,
from which the ﬁrm would deduct taxes tyi, thereby leaving the worker a net wage (1  t)yi.
In this economy, however, it is possible to evade taxes and social security contributions by not reporting
part or all of the worker’s earnings to the authorities. A ﬁrm employing a worker with productivity yi must
therefore decide how much of the worker’s production to declare to the tax authorities, xi, and how much to
conceal, yi xi. If xi = yi, theﬁrmisfullycompliantwiththeregulations. If xi = 0, thefullproductishidden






income, or be completely in the black market, by declaring nothing. A worker can also decide to be inactive.
In this case, income is normalized to 0.
Tax authorities may inspect ﬁrms to ﬁnd out whether they comply with ﬁscal regulation. We assume there
to be an exogenously given probability of an audit being performed  2 [0,1]. Fines proportional to the
amount of evasion are imposed on ﬁrms in case tax evasion is detected and, given the assumption of risk-
neutral ﬁrms and risk-averse workers, there is no incentive for workers and ﬁrms to negotiate a different
risk-sharing arrangement. However, the fact that an audit is performed does not imply that the authority
with certainty discovers the true tax liability. Instead, it may ﬁnd evidence to impute an income ^ yi 2 [0,yi],
where yi is the true product. Imperfect detection is a plausible assumption and is supported by empirical
evidence. For instance, Feinstein (1991) estimates that IRS examiners on average managed to detect only half
of the tax evasion in the forms they audited7, while Erard (1997) rejects the hypothesis of perfect detection
in his empirical investigation based on the TCMP (Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program).
I assume that ^ yi is distributed over the support [0,yi]8 according to pdf h() and cdf H(), so that H(0) = 0
and H(yi) = 1, and H() does not depend on xi. To simplify the discussion, I assume that h() > 0 within the
support, so that H() is invertible within [0,yi].
6 No distinction is made between labour cost and gross wage and the two concepts are equivalent in the model.
7 An IRS study found that for every dollar of underreported income detected by examiners without the aid of third-party information documents, another
$ 2.28 went undetected (cited in Feldman and Slemrod, 2007).
8 The assumption is that the tax authority cannot assess and upheld in court a tax liability higher than the true one. To extend the model to situations
where this may not be the case, due for instance to ambiguity in the tax code, would be straightforward.
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Given a declaration of xi and collected evidence of a true tax liability of ^ yi, the tax authority imposes on the
ﬁrm, in case ^ yi > xi , the payment of t
 
^ yi   xi

, consisting of taxes plus an additional ﬁne proportional to
the assessed tax evasion, thus  > 1. In case ^ yi  xi, the tax authority cannot prove any tax evasion, so no





(^ yi   xi)h(^ yi)d^ y. (1)
Below, I determine the equilibrium wage and evasion. For convenience, subscripts are suppressed where not
necessary.
EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT MINIMUM WAGE
For a ﬁrm employing a worker with productivity y, declaring x, and paying a gross wage w, the possible
realizations of proﬁts are given by10
 =

y  w with probability 1 
y  w   f with probability 
,
where f , the expected ﬁne in case an audit is conducted, is given by 1. Therefore, the expected proﬁts for the
ﬁrm are
E () = y  w   f . (2)
Income I for a worker employed in a ﬁrm paying a gross wage w and declaring to the ﬁscal authorities x is
given by
I = w   tx. (3)
This expression captures the fact that taxes and social security contributions are deducted from the worker’s
declared gross wage x, not from his true gross wage, w. As income is non-stochastic, income maximization
correspondstoutilitymaximization, giventheassumptionthat(indirect)utilityonlydependsonnetincome.
The ﬁrm and the worker agree to choose x so as to maximize the expected total surplus available to them,
equivalent to the product minus total expected payments to ﬁscal authorities, represented by taxes and social
security contributions paid on the declared wage and expected ﬁnes. Therefore, the optimal declaration is
x s.t. max
x2[0,y]
y   f   tx. (4)











The second-order condition,  th(x) < 0, is always satisﬁed. The boundary condition x  y is always
satisﬁed. Notice that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does not take place unless  ! +1. The condition x  0
implies that full evasion will take place, i.e. x = 0, when enforcement is very weak, i.e.   1. To simplify
9 An equivalent narrative is that in an audit, the tax authority may ﬁnd no evidence at all of tax evasion with probability H(xi), which is increasing as the
















10 Actually, when an audit is performed, possible realizations of proﬁts are a continuum, due to the stochastic nature of the ﬁne. For expositional
convenience, the expected value of the ﬁne is considered.
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the notation, the two enforcement parameters are summarized by   1=(). To summarize, the solution
to the reporting problem without minimum wage is given by
x =

H 1(1 ) if  < 1
0 if   1
. (5)
As @ =@  < 0 and @ =@  < 0 , in an interior solution, the fraction of production that is evaded decreases
as enforcement improves.
The equilibrium ﬁne, f , is given by substituting 5 into 1. Substituting this into 2 and considering the
free entry condition, we get the equilibrium gross wage, w = y    f , that substituted into 3 gives the
equilibrium net income
I = y   f    tx. (6)
To obtain a closed form solution, from now on I will assume h() to be uniform in the support [0,y], i.e.
^ yi s U[0,yi]. The expression for the expected ﬁne becomes11
 f = t(y   x)2=(2y). (7)
Thus, the cost of evasion is quadratic in the amount of evasion, y   x, as assumed, for instance, in Marion
and Muehlegger (2008). The optimal reporting behavior given by 5 becomes
x =

(1 )y if  < 1
0 if   1
. (8)
Thus, the model implies that, irrespective of the speciﬁc level of productivity, a constant fraction of the true
tax liability is revealed to the ﬁscal authorities. Using 7, the expected ﬁne is given in equilibrium by
 f  =

yt=2 if  < 1
yt=(2) if   1
(9)
and thus, substituting 8 and 9 into 6, I get the worker’s equilibrium net income
I =

y(1  t)+yt=2 if  < 1
y[1  t=(2)] if   1
. (10)
Given the detection technology, the expected fraction of unreported tax liability, y x, that is discovered in
case of auditing is
y Z
x
(^ y   x)h(^ y)d^ y=(y   x) = =2, (11)
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true product. Thus, it is relatively easy
to get away with tax-evasion. For example, in an economy where 30% of the income is concealed, only 15%
of the evasion is, on average, detected in case of auditing.
11 In Tonin (2007) I present an alternative setting for imperfect detection in which the tax authority devotes an amount of "auditing resources" to every
taxpayer. This gives rise to an equivalent expression for the expected ﬁne. I also show that the mechanism presented in this paper is robust to the
case of the probability of an audit being conditioned on declared income.
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In this section, I study what are the effects of introducing a minimum monthly wage $, with universal cover-
age, in the economy described in the previous section. Workers cannot be legally employed at a wage below
the minimum, in the sense that their reported gross wage cannot be below the minimum. The assumption
in the model is that the minimum wage is ﬁxed on a monthly basis for full-time work and that no alternative
working-time arrangements are available. This is a good approximation of the Hungarian case, on which I
conduct the empirical analysis12. Moreover, in Tonin (2007), the model is extended to the case where the
minimum wage is ﬁxed on an hourly basis, labor supply can vary across workers and underreporting can
involve both hours of work and hourly wage. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. In the following,
I focus on the case with partial evasion, i.e.  2 (0,1) 13.
EFFECTS ON THE DISTRIBUTION
With the introduction of a minimum wage, 4 becomes
x s.t. max
x2f0g[[$,y]
y   f   tx.
The only difference is in the choice set which shrinks from [0,y] to f0g[[$,y]. The introduction of the
minimum wage divides worker-ﬁrm pairs into three categories:
1. High productivity: yi > $=(1 )
2. Intermediate productivity: $  yi  $=(1 )
3. Low productivity: yi < $.
Worker-ﬁrm pairs characterized by high productivity would have declared more than the minimum wage
anyway, so they are unaffected by it. The minimum wage is instead a binding constraint for worker-ﬁrm
pairs that would have declared less in its absence. I ﬁrst analyze the case of low-productivity workers.
Low productivity
A worker with productivity below the minimum wage, yi < $, can only work in the black market or be
inactive. The possibility of a worker paying back part of his wage to the ﬁrm is thus excluded. The main
results are qualitatively unaffected by this modelling choice. From 10, I get income in case of work in the
black market, i.e. full evasion,
Ibm  yi [1  t=(2)]. (12)
12 In 2001-2000 part-timers accounted for only 3.6% of all employees. See section 4 for further details on Hungary. According to Eurostat data from
LFS, the share of part-timers in Central and Eastern European countries is generally low, at around 7% of the employees. Notice that according to
the OECD "To counter this [under-declaring earnings per employee], the tax authorities may appeal to employment regulations such as the minimum
wage and restrictions on part-time and temporary work. This issue helps explain why countries with a large informal economy maintain de facto strict
employment regulations, even though these regulations are seen by many analysts as a prime cause of informality." (OECD, 2004, page 227, italics
added).
13 For this to be the case, I need  > 1. By assumption  > 1, but , the probability of being subject to an audit, may be low, so this condition may
seem restrictive. Notice, however, that in this model, an audit is extremely ineffective. As already mentioned if, for instance, 30% of income is evaded,
only 15% of evaded income is, on average, discovered during an audit. Thus, instead of a full-ﬂedged investigation, an audit should in the present
set-up rather be interpreted as a routine check by the ﬁscal authorities, thus occurring much more frequently than a thorough inquiry.
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Income in case of inactivity is assumed to be 0. The labor market status is chosen by comparing income in
the two cases, giving the following condition
Ibm > 0 ,  > t=2.
Then, if  > t=2, workers with productivity below the minimum wage work in the black market, otherwise
they withdraw from the labor market. Thus, the prediction is that, for a given tax rate, in economies where
enforcement is quite effective, i.e.  is low, the minimum wage pushes workers into inactivity and therefore,
it has a negative impact on efﬁciency, as productive labor remains idle. Instead, in economies where enforce-
ment is not very effective, the minimum wage has no negative impact on efﬁciency as workers continue to




for worker-ﬁrm pairs whose optimal declaration in case of no minimum wage regulation is less than $, but
with a productivity above $, i.e.
(1 )yi  $  yi , $  yi  $=(1 ). (13)
Income in case of declaring $ is given by substituting x = $ in 7 and 6












Declaring a wage higher than the minimum is never optimal for this group. Moreover, as Imw > 0 for
productivities satisfying 13, these workers will never go into inactivity. The choice is thus between declaring
the minimum wage or working in the black market and declaring 0. The comparison between income in case
of declaring the minimum wage and income in the black market as given by 12 gives the following condition
Imw  Ibm , yi  $=[2(1 )]  ymw. (15)
As the choice between employment at the minimum wage and employment in the black market is only rele-
vant for workers satisfying 13 to determine the behavior once a minimum wage is introduced, it is necessary
to position ymw in the interval [$,$=(1 )]. The threshold ymw is greater than the minimum wage if and
only if  > 1=2, while it is always the case that ymw < $=(1 ). Thus, if the degree of underreporting is
high, i.e.  > 1=2, the threshold ymw is internal to the interval deﬁned by condition 13. This implies that
some of the workers affected by the minimum wage and with a productivity higher than the minimum wage
prefer to decrease evasion and declare the minimum, while others prefer to go into the black market. If the
degree of underreporting is instead low, i.e.   1=2, all workers affected by the minimum wage and with a
productivity higher than the minimum wage prefer to increase compliance and declare the minimum.
The results are summarized in the below proposition.
Proposition 1 The introduction of the minimum wage in an economy with underreporting of earnings induces
some workers to increase compliance by increasing declared earnings to the minimum wage level. Workers with
a high productivity are unaffected. Workers with a productivity below the minimum wage work in the black
market if enforcement is not too effective, otherwise they withdraw from the labor force.












(1 ) < x < ¯ y(1 )
0 otherwise
,
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Figure 1
Declared income
where g() is the pdf of the productivity distribution. After the introduction of the minimum wage, the
distribution of declared earnings is given by
gmw(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <





















i f $ < x  ¯ y(1 )
0 otherwise.
.
Thus, a "smooth" distribution of productivity is associated with a "smooth" distribution of declared earnings
without a minimum wage. However, with the introduction of the minimum wage, two spikes appear at the
minimum wage level and at zero. Thus, I can state the following:
Proposition 2 In a perfectly competitive labor market with underreporting of earnings, a spike at the minimum
wage level appears in the distribution of declared earnings.
Figure 1 depicts declared income as a function of productivity with and without the minimum wage. De-
clared income when there is no tax evasion is also plotted as a reference.
FISCAL EFFECTS
The minimum wage divides worker-ﬁrm pairs into three categories: those declaring nothing, those declaring
the minimum wage and the unaffected, i.e. those declaring more than the minimum. Here, I ﬁrst determine
payments to ﬁscal authorities for each category. Then, I use the above analysis of the distribution of declared
earnings to ﬁnd out the effects of the minimum wage on ﬁscal revenues.
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Payments to ﬁscal authorities
Total payments, P, to ﬁscal authorities include taxes, T, and expected ﬁnes, F. For worker-ﬁrm pairs not
affected by the minimum wage, taxes are T1 = yt(1 ), while expected ﬁnes are F1 = yt=2, giving a total
payment of
P1 = (1 =2)ty.
Underreporting gives worker-ﬁrm pairs with a relatively high productivity the opportunity to reduce the
"effective"14 tax rate by a factor =2. For worker-ﬁrm pairs declaring the minimum wage, taxes are T2 = t$,
expected ﬁnes are ﬁscal payments are F2 = t(y  $)2=(2y), giving a total payment of
P2 = t$ + t(y  $)2=(2y).
The remaining category is represented by worker-ﬁrm pairs that are either in the black economy (when
  t=2) or do not participate in the labor market (when  < t=2). For workers in the black market, ﬁnes
are the only type of payment, so that
P3 = F3 = ty=(2).
Workers who withdraw from the labor market do not contribute to the public ﬁnances. Notice that P3=y 
P2=y  P1=y in the relevant intervals15. Expected payments as a portion of income are highest for worker-
ﬁrm pairs in the black economy and lowest for worker-ﬁrm pairs not affected by the minimum wage. Thus,
considering expected total payments, it is possible to state the following:
Proposition 3 Theinteractionofminimumwageandunderreportingtransformsanominallyneutraltaxsystem
into a regressive one.
The intuition behind this result is simple: worker-ﬁrm pairs try to minimize the share of the product paid
to ﬁscal authorities. The minimum wage is not a binding constraint for high productivity workers who
manage to reduce the "effective" tax rate. For instance, if  = 40%, the "effective" tax rate for these workers
is 80% of t. For workers with intermediate productivity, the minimum wage is binding. Thus, they are
less "successful" in minimizing their "effective" tax rate, even if they still manage to reduce it below t. Low
productivity workers are even more constrained, as their only choice is to work in the black market or
withdraw from the labor market, and they may end up facing an "effective" tax rate above t. With  = 40%,
for instance, the "effective" tax rate for these workers is indeed 125% of t. Figure 2 shows the effective tax
rate as a function of productivity.
Effects of the minimum wage on revenues
When workers with productivity below the minimum wage work in the black market, i.e. when   t=2,





















14 In the sense of total expected payments to ﬁscal authorities, including ﬁnes, over total product, i.e. P=y.
15 In particular, P2=y  P1=y 8y, P3=y  P1=y 8y,P3=y  P2=y , y  $=[2(1 )]. As only workers with productivity yi 
$maxf1,1=[2(1 ]g will declare the minimum wage, P3=y  P2=y for the relevant interval.
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Figure 2
Effective tax rate
The marginal worker is indifferent between being employed in the black market or declaring the minimum
wage if  > 1=2, while he prefers not to be completely underground if t=2    1=2. In the ﬁrst case, the
only effect of a marginal increase in the minimum wage is to extract higher payments from workers declaring
it while in the second case, there is the additional effect of pushing worker-ﬁrm pairs previously in the ofﬁcial





When workers with a productivity below the minimum wage withdraw from the labor market, i.e. when
 < t=2 , there is no black market from which to extract ﬁnes, and total revenues are given by the last two
terms in expression 16. Then,
@ R
@ $




The ﬁrst term represents the ﬁscal loss due to the withdrawal of workers from the labor market, the second
term the higher payments by workers declaring the minimum wage. The net effect depends on the shape of
the distribution. It is possible then to state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When underreporting is high, revenues increase with the minimum wage. When underreporting
is low, the effect of increasing the minimum wage on revenues depends on the productivity distribution.
The intuition is straightforward: maximization of workers’ net income is equivalent to minimization of
transfers to the government. Choice is limited to the possible declaration space f0g[[$,+1). Increasing the
minimum wage shrinks the possible declaration space, so that the newly chosen compliance after the increase
in the minimum wage cannot make workers better off. When the increase in the minimum wage does not
have a negative impact on production, i.e. it does not "shrink the pie", this implies that the government
cannot be made worse off, i.e. revenues cannot decrease. This can be counterbalanced by a decrease in
revenues due to reduced total production when an increase in the minimum wage pushes low productivity
workers out of the labor market.
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This implies that countries where underreporting is serious because of limited enforcement capacity can
use the minimum wage to boost ﬁscal revenues, without having to worry too much about the impact on
efﬁciency. As enforcement improves, the minimum wage becomes a less effective ﬁscal instrument and ef-
ﬁciency issues become more prominent. However, equity issues are also at stake, as the minimum wage
increases revenues by extracting more payments from low productivity workers.
THE IMPACT OF A MINIMUM WAGE HIKE
Here, I characterize the effects of a minimum wage hike on disposable income. Suppose that in the ﬁrst
period, the minimum wage is $1, increasing to $2 > $1 in the second period. The change in income due to
the minimum wage hike is I = I2  I1, where It is income in period t.
If a worker already operates in the underground market or declares earnings above $2 in the ﬁrst period,
he will not change his behavior after the minimum wage hike and thus, his income remains unchanged,
I = 0. A worker whose ofﬁcial earnings are exactly equal to the minimum wage in the ﬁrst period, $1,
may experience an increase in declared earnings to $2, with a corresponding income change of
I =  t ($2  $1)[$2 +$1  2y(1 )]=(2y) < 0 16.
Alternatively, his declared earnings may decrease to 0. The income change in this case is given by
I = t$1[$1  2y(1 )]=(2y) < 0 17,18.
In any case, the minimum wage hike results in an income decline for this type of worker. The last type of
worker to be analyzed here is the one with declared earnings between the old and new minimum wage in
the ﬁrst period. Also in this case declared earnings may increase in the second period to $2, resulting in an
income drop given by
I =  t [y(1 ) $2]2=(2y) < 0,
or decrease to 0, with the corresponding income change given by
I =  ty(1 )2=(2) < 0 19.
Notice that the decline in income for workers declaring $2 in the second period increases as the distance be-
tween the declared income in the ﬁrst period and $2 increases. Thus, a worker who was declaring marginally
above the minimum wage $1 in the ﬁrst period and increases his declaration to $2 experiences a larger in-
come decline than a worker also declaring $2 in the second period, but whose declared income in the ﬁrst
period was higher. The income decline is even larger for workers who declared the minimum wage in the
ﬁrst period. The model thus predicts the following:
Proposition 5 As a result of a minimum wage hike, workers whose declared earnings before the hike are between
the old and the new minimum wage experience a decline in income. Other workers are unaffected. For those
workersdeclaringthenewminimumwageafterthehike, thedeclineinincomeincreaseswiththedistancebetween
the new minimum wage and the declared income before the hike.
The intuition behind these results is that increasing the minimum wage effectively shrinks the choice set of
workersdeclaringasumbetweenthenewandtheoldminimumwageinthepreviousperiod, therebymaking
them worse-off. These predictions are tested in the following section.
16 This is due to the fact that workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t. (1 )yi  $1 < $2 .
17 This is due to the fact that workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t. yi > $1 if   1=2 and yi > $1=[2(1 )] if  > 1=2.
18 This assumes that workers go underground. If  < t=2, so that workers withdraw from the labor market, the decline in income is obvious.
19 See previous note.
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I test the prediction of the model by analyzing the effects of the massive increase in the minimum wage that
took place in Hungary in 2001.
In Hungary underreporting of earnings is widespread. For instance, 56% of the households interviewed in
a survey claim that in their neighborhood, employers are declaring the minimum wage to the tax authority,
while unofﬁcially paying additional wages20 (ECONSTAT, 1999.) This may be related to the fact that tax-
ation on labor is very heavy, also for low paid workers. In the period 2000-2002, the tax wedge on a single
person without children earning 2/3 of the average production wage was at around 46%, i.e. one of the
highest in Europe, with marginal rates above 55% (OECD, 2001 and 2002).
The statutory minimum wage21 was increased from 25,500 HUF in 2000 (98 EUR or 90 USD using the
average exchange rate for the corresponding year) to 40,000 HUF in 2001 (156 EUR, 140 USD.) As a con-
sequence, the corresponding total monthly payments to the ﬁscal authorities (PIT and SSC) increased by
around 9,000 HUF (36 EUR, 32 USD)22. It is interesting to notice how the hike was decided one-sidedly by
the centre-right government, against the opposition of the largest trade union federation. The share of full-
time employees paid 95%-105% of the minimum wage in ﬁrms employing more than ﬁve workers jumped
from 5% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2001 (Kertesi and Köll˝ o, 2003). The labor market impact of this massive hike
was modest. Kertesi and Köll˝ o (2003) compare the job loss risk of workers earning 90-110% of the minimum
wage in 2001 to that of workers earning 110-125% and ﬁnd only a small effect on the quarterly outﬂow into
unemployment23, while they ﬁnd no effect on the ﬂow from employment to non-participation. They also
ﬁnd a high level of compliance with the minimum wage regulation, with only a minor spillover on the wage
distribution24. The conclusion of their study is that “despite the brutal price shock the immediate effect did
not seem dramatic”. Overall, in the period 2000-2001, the activity rate remained stable at around 60%, with
unemployment declining from 6.4% to 5.7% and youth unemployment from 12.5% to 11.3% (see table 1 for
more details).
Hungary is thus an ideal case to study the interaction between tax evasion and minimum wage: underreport-
ing is widespread and in 2001 a massive minimum wage hike took place with a very modest impact on the
labor market. In what follows, I describe the empirical methodology and results.
20 The failure to correctly report tax liability involves the payment of a penalty corresponding to 50% of the tax evaded, plus late payment interest
corresponding to twice the prime rate of the Hungarian National Bank, at around 11% in the period 2000-2001, for up to three years (OECD, 2004b).
Economic organizations with legal entity status were in the period 2000-2001 subject to a 45% "audit intensity", deﬁned as the number of completed
audits in the tax year (without cash-ﬂow audits) divided by the number of taxpayers in the given taxpayer group at the end of the previous year. The
corresponding number for economic organizations without legal entity status was around 19% (APEH, 2006).
21 The statutory minimum wage covers all employment contracts and relates to gross monthly earnings net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonuses for
full-time employment. For part-timers, it is proportionally lower, but part-timers only account for a small portion of all employees (3.6% in 2001-2002).
Regarding contractual types, the only source of data I am aware of, the Hungarian Unemployment Insurance Exit to Job Survey, reports that 64.7% of
the low-wage UI recipients who found a job in April 2001 received a ﬁxed salary, 33.8% were paid an hourly wage and the remaining 1.5% concluded a
business contract with the employer (Kertesi and Köll˝ o, 2003). Thus, the model assumption of a monthly minimum wage is well suited for the Hungarian
case.
22 See table 2 for details.
23 For a 25-year old male with ﬁve years of tenure, for instance, the estimated quarterly ﬂow is 0.243% for the treated and 0.119% for the control group.
At average age and tenure of the control group (40, 7.33), the ﬁgures are 0.0168% for the treated and 0.0068% for the control group. Average age and
tenure of the treatment group are not very different at 39.2 and 6.67, respectively. Notice that both these rates indicate rather long prospective tenures
and thus a very modest job-loss risk, even for workers affected by the minimum wage.
24 Looking at the job ﬁnding probability, they ﬁnd a 7-8% drop for the low-wage unemployed, deﬁned as those receiving lower than average unemployment
beneﬁts, relative to the unskilled as a whole, deﬁned as those with less than secondary education.
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THE STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK
Reported income, xi,t , is observed for household i at time t. Reported income is related to true income, Ii,t
, by the following relationship
xi,t = ki,tIi,t, (17)
where 0  ki,t  1. True income is related to permanent income, I P
i,t, by the following relationship
Ii,t = pi,tI P
i,t, (18)
where pi,t  0. By combining 17 and 18 and taking logs, I can write permanent income as a function of
reported income:
lnI P
i,t = lnxi,t  lnki,t  ln pi,t. (19)
The relationship between food consumption and permanent income is assumed to be
lnci,t = Zi,t+lnI P
i,t +"i,t, (20)
where Zi,t is a row vector of household characteristics. The use of food consumption is standard in the
literature estimating tax evasion by using household budget survey data. This is due to the fact that food
consumption is more precisely recorded than consumption of other types of goods over the limited time
period in which the survey is conducted. Substituting 19 into 20, I can express consumption as a function of
reported income
lnci,t = Zi,t+lnxi,t  lnki,t  ln pi,t +"i,t,
and taking ﬁrst differences I get
lnci,t = Zi,t+lnxi,t  lnki,t  ln pi,t +"i,t. (21)
As seen in section ??, the theory indicates that as a result of a minimum wage hike, workers whose declared
earnings before the hike are between the old and the new minimum wage experience a decline in income,
while other workers are unaffected. Thus, for the former group of workers, we have
lnIi,t = lnxi,t  lnki,t < 0.
In particular, for workers whose ofﬁcial earnings increase to the new minimum after the hike, there is an
increase in their compliance with the ﬁscal regulation, while workers unaffected by the minimum wage hike




< 0 for the "treatment group"
= 0 for the "control group"
.
To identify the shock to the "underreporting technology" due to the minimum wage hike, i.e.  lnki,t,
I use a difference-in-difference approach. The change in food consumption for households that appear to
beneﬁt from the minimum wage hike, in the meaning that their declared income increases, is contrasted to
thechangeinfoodconsumptionforsimilar,butunaffected,households. Asln pi,t isunobserved,particular
care must be taken not to confound the shock to the ability to underreport with other shocks to permanent
income related to the minimum wage hike due, for instance, to increased labor market risk. For this reason,
I consider in the analysis only employees who remained employed for at least 12 months after the hike: their
employment status is clearly not adversely affected by the minimum wage hike in this period. Also, in some
speciﬁcations, I control for a rich set of employee characteristics and geographical dummies, thus controlling
for possible shocks along these dimensions.
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Speciﬁcation
The basic speciﬁcation is the following
ci = + Mi +T REATi +"i, (22)
where ci is the change in food consumption for household i in two consecutive years. Mi is a set of
dummies allowing for different trends depending on the months in which the household is surveyed in
two consecutive years. The seasonality displayed by food prices makes it important to compare households
that were interviewed in exactly the same month in both years. The exact deﬁnition of this and the other
variables is provided in the Appendix. This speciﬁcation is similar to the one used in Johnson, Parker, and
Souleles (2006) to study the impact of the 2001 federal income tax rebates on consumption expenditures.
The coefﬁcient of interest is . I provide the exact deﬁnition of T REATi in what follows. I also run
regressions including additional controls like the change in household income or geographical dummies.
Robust standard errors are reported. The reason for preferring a speciﬁcation in levels to one in logs is
that the shock to underreporting is not proportional to income but absolute. According to the model, every
workerdeclaringtheminimumwagein2000andthenincreasinghisdeclarationtothenewminimumin2001
experiences a decline in his income of around 9,000 HUF, irrespective of differences in the income level that
may arise from the availability of other sources of income or heterogeneity in the degree of underreporting.
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
I use data from the Hungarian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel25, in particular the 1999-2000 and
2000-2001 panels. More information about the way the survey is conducted is available in the Appendix and
in Kapitány and Molnár (2004). It is worth underlining that surveyors are expected to collect the income
data from documentation like the tax return sheet or the tax certiﬁcation of employer. This makes it more
likely that income in the survey corresponds to income reported to the ﬁscal authorities, rather than to the
possibly different true income. The distribution of earnings in the dataset (see ﬁgure 3) clearly presents a
spike at the minimum wage level, corresponding to 4-5% in 1999-2000 and increasing to around 14% in 2001.
These ﬁgures are consistent with LFS data and underline the relevance of the minimum wage hike.
I consider a household as treated if at least one of its members has been affected by the minimum wage hike.
I use two different methods to single out these individuals. In the ﬁrst case, I select individuals employed in
2000 at a wage between the minimum wage in 2000 and the will-be minimum wage in 2001. The treatment
group is thus only deﬁned on basis of pre-treatment characteristics. In the second case, I impose an additional
requirement: being employed in 2001 at the minimum wage. The reported earnings of these employees are
thus actually pushed up by the policy intervention while, in the former case, they were only potentially
pushed up. For this reason, I label the two cases "actual" and "potential". In both instances, I deﬁne the
variable "treatment" as the number of household members conforming to the above mentioned criteria. I
also employ an alternative deﬁnition of treatment for the "actual" case. Instead of simply counting their
number, I sum up the difference between the minimum wage in 2001 and earnings in 2000 for all members
of the household affected by the hike. The aim of this continuous measure is to capture the intensity of
treatment. I label this deﬁnition of treatment "continuous" as opposed to the "dummy" treatment previously
described.
I deﬁne households in the control group on the basis of the presence among their members of individuals
earning somewhat more than the 2001 minimum wage. To check for the validity of the control group, below
I conduct a "placebo test" where I ascertain the absence of a treatment effect in the pre-policy period. For this
25 The Hungarian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel is created by the Institute of Economics (IE), Hungarian Academy of Sciences from the
original HHBS of the Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce. The data set is work in progress. The IE made every effort to clean the data and it cannot be
held liable for any remaining errors.
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Figure 3
Earnings from main activity
purpose, I look at changes in food consumption in the period 1999-2000. Sample size considerations restrict
this analysis to the "potential" treatment case.
To ensure comparability, I restrict the analysis to households that keep a constant composition and whose
income is within certain limits. Moreover, I consider only employees with stable positions, i.e. employees
who keep their job for at least 12 months after the minimum wage hike, to avoid confounding an increase in
labor market risk with an increase in compliance with ﬁscal regulation. I provide the precise deﬁnitions of
treatment and control groups in what follows.
All regressions include a set of dummies for the months in which the household kept the diary. These
dummies control for time shocks, e.g. ﬂuctuations in food prices. A set of regressions also includes controls
for all employee characteristics available in the dataset (sector of employment, position, type of employer)
and for geographical characteristics (county and type of settlement). These variables control, for instance,
for labor market shocks that are speciﬁc to a given sector or for differences in food inﬂation among different
areas of the country. Also, in some speciﬁcations I control for changes in reported income.
Potential treatment
For the potentail treatment case, I analyse the two panels covering the years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. For
each two-year panel, I consider only households that kept a constant composition in the period and that had
a positive monthly net income below 200,000 HUF (approx. 780 EUR) in both years. Moreover, I only
consider households where at least one member has been employed for the whole period and whose wage in
2000 is between the minimum wage in 2000 and 200% of the minimum wage in 2001. I restrict the sample
in this way to ensure comparability between treatment and control groups. The variable T REATi contains
the total number of members of household i classiﬁed as private sector employees who have been employed
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Figure 4
Household Income Distribution
for the whole period and who in the year 2000 earn a wage between the minimum wage in that year (25,500
HUF) and the minimum wage in the year 2001 (40,000 HUF).
Households in the treatment and in the control group are very similar. In 2001 the total net income of
households in the control group is only 7% higher than net income of households in the treatment group
(see table 3) and there is considerable overlap in the distribution of income (see ﬁgure 4, ﬁrst two rows). This
is due to the fact that workers affected by the minimum wage are not the sole earners in the household. Both
types of household spend around 25% of net income in food and the estimated relationship between food
consumption and income is very similar in the pre-treatment period (see ﬁgure 5, ﬁrst two rows).
The estimation results (see table 4) show that the dynamic of food consumption did not differ between the
treatmentandcontrolgroupinthepre-treatmentperiod1999-2000. Thisplacebotestconﬁrmsthevalidityof
the control group. As predicted by the theory, the coefﬁcient of the treatment variable is always negative and
signiﬁcant in the period 2000-2001, after the policy has been implemented. The magnitude of the estimated
coefﬁcients of around 1,300-2,000 HUF (5-8 EUR) represents 6-9% of food consumption for the treatment
group. Thus, they are also economically signiﬁcant.
Actual treatment
For the actual treatment, I use only the 2000-2001 panel. Also in this case, I restrict the sample to households
that kept a constant composition in the period and with a positive net income below 200,000 HUF (approx.
780 EUR) in both years. Moreover, I only select households with at least one member employed during the
whole of 2001 at a wage between 90% and 200% of the minimum wage in 2001.
I consider an employee’s ﬁscal behavior as affected by the minimum wage hike if two criteria are satisﬁed:
MNB WORKING PAPERS  2009/2 21MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
Figure 5
Food Consumption and Income
1. in 2000, he must have been employed at a wage between 90% of the minimum wage in 2000 and 110%
of the minimum wage in 2001;
2. in 2001, he must earn a wage between 90%-110% of the minimum wage in 2001, be employed in the
private sector and for the whole of 2001;
In the "dummy treatment", the variable T REATi contains the number of household members satisfying
these criteria. In the "continuous treatment", the variable T REATi is the sum within household i of the
difference between the minimum wage in 2001 and the wage in 2000 for the same people as in the "dummy
treatment" with the difference that 100% and not 110% of the minimum wage in 2001 are used as the upper
bound.
Also in this case, households in the treatment and control group are very similar26, with total net income
only 13% higher in 2001 for the control group than for the treatment group (see table 5) and with substantial
overlapping in the distribution of income (see ﬁgure 4, last row). Both types of household spend around 26%
of net income in food and the estimated relationship between food consumption and income is also in this
case very similar in the pre-treatment period (see ﬁgure 5, last row).
The estimation results conﬁrm the previous analysis (see table 6). In the "dummy treatment", the coefﬁcient
of interest is always negative, statistically signiﬁcant, and of a similar magnitude to the coefﬁcients in the
"potential treatment" case. In the "continuous treatment", the coefﬁcient of interest is always negative.
Statistical signiﬁcance is achieved when additional controls beside month dummies are included. Also in this
case the magnitude of the coefﬁcient is economically signiﬁcant.
26 The descriptive analysis is limited to the deﬁnitions used in the "dummy treatment".
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Robustness checks
I repeated the above analysis for two ﬁctitious minimum wage hikes: an increase from 50,000 HUF to 64,500
HUF and an increase from 50,000 HUF to 78,431 HUF. The starting point of 50,000 HUF has been cho-
sen so that there is no overlap between individuals affected by the real hike and the ones considered to be
affected by the ﬁctitious hike. The end points have been chosen so that the absolute difference between the
two minimum wages or their ratio is the same as in the real case. All other quantities have been modiﬁed
accordingly. For these two ﬁctitious cases, there is never a signiﬁcant treatment effect (results not reported).
This indicates that the treatment effect found in the main analysis is not a statistical artifact, but is indeed
due to the minimum wage hike.
To check whether the treatment effect is due to substitution between consumption items, I repeated the
analysis for thirteen other consumption categories (results not reported). The treatment effect is signiﬁcantly
negative in some speciﬁcations for the "beverages and tobacco" category. The treatment effect for "total
expenditures" has generally a negative sign in both the "actual treatment" speciﬁcation and the "potential
treatment" post-policy intervention period, but it is not signiﬁcant. The lack of signiﬁcance in this and in
most of other categories is not surprising, as the use of food consumption in the literature is justiﬁed by the
fact that in household budget surveys this item is measured with much higher precision than other types of
consumption. All in all, what can be concluded is that there is no evidence of substitution effects.
To summarize, treated households experience a signiﬁcant drop in their consumption of food compared to
households in the control group. This is the case even if they appear to actually beneﬁt from the minimum
wage hike, in that their reported net income increases more than for the control group, both in absolute and
in relative terms. A series of placebo tests conﬁrms that this is indeed due to the minimum wage hike. More-
over, considering only households who appears to beneﬁt from the hike excludes the alternative explanation
of an adverse labor market effect of the minimum wage. Thus, we can conclude that the empirical analysis
supports the theoretical prediction about the minimum wage impact on ﬁscal compliance.
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This paper examines an aspect of minimum wage policy that has not been investigated before, by looking at
its interaction with tax evasion by employed labor. There are important policy implications for countries
where underreporting of earnings is a relevant phenomenon. On the one hand, if the aim of the minimum
wage hike is to boost income for those affected, as is often claimed when such policies are introduced, the
policy move could have opposite consequences, if no corrective measures are taken on the ﬁscal side. An
increase in ofﬁcially reported income could actually correspond to a decrease in true income, unless the
minimum wage hike is accompanied by a decrease in ﬁscal pressure for minimum wage earners. On the other
hand, if the aim is to contrast underreporting of earnings, introducing or increasing the minimum wage may
represent an effective measure that may prove to be cost effective as compared to more direct measures aimed
at ﬁghting the black economy, such as hiring new tax inspectors. The minimum wage targets the lower
end of the productivity distribution, but this may be desirable as there is some evidence that tax evasion
among employees is concentrated here (Lemieux et al. [1994]; Fiorio and D’Amuri [2005]). Admittedly, the
minimum wage represents a rather blunt instrument to ﬁght underreporting, but it may be sharpened by
differentiating it along dimensions related to productivity (see for instance the Bulgarian experience [Koleva,
2007; Neykov, 2003]).
There are also implications for the most researched aspect of minimum wage policy, i.e. its effect on em-
ployment. Unreported income may act as a buffer to absorb minimum wage shocks, implying that the
employment effect of a minimum wage hike would be smaller in countries with a high degree of informality
compared to countries where the degree of informality is lower. An example of this is the subdued employ-
ment effect of the massive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001. Another implications
is that a high spike at the minimum wage level may not be due to a relatively high and binding minimum
wage, but to a high degree of informality. Some supportive cross-country evidence for European countries is
presented in Tonin (2007). The paper also contributes to the literature on tax evasion by introducing a new
and simple way of modelling it, based on the idea that detection is not perfect. This can be used to study
other aspects of reporting behavior and tax enforcement.
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Appendix
THE SURVEY AND MAIN VARIABLES
The sample consists of around 10,000 households. One third of the sample is rotated in each year. The
two-year panels of interest for this study, i.e. 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, contain slightly more than 3,500
households. Notice that households interviewed from 1999 till 2001 appear in both panels, so that around
half of the sample is the same in the two panels. The population of interest is considerably reduced by the
fact that all adults are retirees in around 40% of the households. A household consists of individuals form-
ing a common income and/or consumption unit, completely or partly sharing the current costs of living.
The selection of the sample is done by multistrata method using census data. In a given month during the
year, households keep a diary registering income and expenditures during the month and “general household
characteristics” containing demographic, employment and housing data. In subsequent interviews, data on
personal incomes, family income, stock of consumer durables, expenditures of signiﬁcant value, are retro-
spectively collected for the year as a whole. The main variables and categories used are:
 "Households with constant family structure" are households where the same individuals are present
for the relevant period. Restricting the analysis to this type of household reduces the sample in the
panel 1999-2000 from 3581 to 3181, with a loss of 400 households, for the panel 2000-2001 the loss is
of 329 households, from 3529 to 3200. The advantage of only using such households is that exactly the
same individuals are observed in two subsequent years.
 M is a set of dummies capturing the month of diary keeping. So, for instance in the panel 2000-2001,
there is a dummy for households that kept the diary in January 2000 and January 2001 and a different
dummy for households that kept the diary in January 2000 and February 2001. Potentially, there are
144 month dummies. However, in both panels, around 70% of the households kept the diary in the
same month in both years.
 "Employees" are deﬁned as employees in public or private enterprises, institutions, co-operatives, pri-
vate entrepreneurs or societies (ﬁrms owned by several private entrepreneurs) with positive earnings
from their main activity during the year and positive months when earnings from the main activity
have been realized. "Public employees" are deﬁned as employees in the category "public or private
enterprises, institutions", active in public administration and defence, compulsory social security, edu-
cation, or health and social work. "Private employees" are all employees who are not public employees.
The dataset contains the number of months in which earnings from the main activity have been real-
ized during the year. If in a given year the number of months corresponds to twelve, the employee is
considered to have been employed the whole year.
 Employee characteristics include three sets of variables, describing the labor market characteristics of
employees in the households.
1. Sectoral: thenumberofemployeesinthehouseholdworkingineachofthe60branchesaccording
to two-digit ISIC (e.g. manufacture of textiles);
2. Position: the number of employees in the household belonging to each of the 10 categories char-
acterizing the hierarchical position27 (e.g. skilled worker);
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3. Type of employer: the number of employees in the household working for different types of
employers28 (e.g. private entrepreneurs);
 Geographical dummies include a set of dummies for the 20 counties into which Hungary is divided
and a set of dummies capturing whether the household’s place of residence is the capital, a large city, a
town or a village. Note that by construction, in subsequent years the survey only includes households
whose place of residence did not change.
 Income variables include household level income29, the sum of net personal incomes of household
members30 plus other components31.
27 top leader; leader, manager; employee with diploma; employee with secondary qualiﬁcation; administrative employee; skilled worker; semi-skilled
worker; unskilled worker; self-employed; family helper.
28 In 1999, the following three categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises, institutions; 2. cooperatives, ﬁrm owned by several private en-
trepreneurs; 3. private entrepreneurs.
In 2000 and 2001, the following four categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises, institutions; 2. cooperatives; 3. private entrepreneurs; 4.
ﬁrm owned by several private entrepreneurs.
29 e.g. family allowance, income from dividends, income from agricultural sales.
30 e.g. income from main activity, self-employment, authorship. Paid social security contributions and personal income tax are subtracted from gross
personal income to obtain net personal income.
31 e.g. income from sales of belonging. Outgoing household transfers, like maintenance for a child outside the household, are subtracted.
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Table 1
Hungary - Main indicators
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Real GDP growth 4.9 4.2 5.2 4.1 4.4
of which household consumption 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.7 9.8
Household saving rate (% GDP) 9.5 7.0 5.7 5.2 2.7
CPI 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3
Gross monthly earnings per full-time employee
- HUF 67764 77187 87645 103553 122482
- real growth (%) 3.5 5.5 3.4 8.1 12.3
Net monthly earnings per full-time employee
- HUF 45162 50076 55785 64913 77622
- real growth (%) 3.6 2.5 1.5 6.4 13.6
Activity rate (% pop. aged 15-64) 58.7 59.8 60.1 59.6 59.7
Employment rate (% pop. aged 15-64) 53.7 55.6 56.3 56.2 56.2
Unemployment rate (% labor force 15+) 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labor force 15-24) 15.0 12.7 12.5 11.3 12.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 16.0 15.6 15.1 14.4 13.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.6
Fixed term contracts (% total employment) 6.5 6.2 7.1 7.5 7.3
Exchange rate (annual average) HUF/EUR 241 253 260 257 243
a. Sources: MNB (Hungarian National Bank), CSO, European Commission.
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Table 2
Tax wedge on minimum wage
2000 2001
Monthly minimum wage (gross) 25500 40000
98 e 156 e


















Net personal income tax at minimum wage 2040 4200







Net take home pay 20273 30800
78 e 120 e
Health care - Lump sum 3900 3900







labor cost 38580 58300
148 e 227 e
Tax wedge 47% 47%
Total ﬁscal payments 18308 27500
70 e 107 e
Difference YY 9193
a. Figures are in Hungarian Forints unless otherwise indicated.
b. Figures in e are calculated using the average exchange rate for the corresponding year.
30 MNB WORKING PAPERS  2009/2REFERENCES
Table 3
Descriptive statistics - Potential treatment
Treatment Control
1999 2000a 2000b 2001 1999 2000a 2000b 2001
N. of HH members 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
(1.1) (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Total net income 74341 82338 80901 101066 83767 95225 92221 107925
(28615) (32431) (33731) (38845) (30582) (33690) (30673) (34941)
Expenditures on food 18564 20181 21032 25229 20960 23413 23167 28354
(8970) (9335) (9599) (11294) (9208) (10441) (10545) (12795)
Total expenditures 75013 82402 79313 97268 79148 86292 86029 101653
(29849) (30491) (30274) (36233) (29139) (33267) (33068) (38120)
- with durables 78994 86651 82829 100630 82209 89667 90646 106724
(34114) (34605) (34330) (41548) (32719) (38940) (40600) (43558)
Exp. on food as % of
total expenditures
25% 24% 27% 26% 26% 27% 27% 28%
Exp. on food as % of
net income
25% 25% 26% 25% 25% 25% 25% 26%
N. of HH 197 195 651 587
N. of treated in HH 1.1 1.1 0 0
N. of control in HH 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.2
a. Only HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF.
b. Standard deviations in parenthesis








































Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics No No Yes Yes
Geographical dummies No No Yes Yes
a. Dependent variable is change in food consumption (excluding own production); monthly.
b. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
c. *** [**] (*) denote signiﬁcance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
d. Treatment: N. of HH members employed for 2000-2001 s.t. $2000  w2000  $2001 in the private sector.
e. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in 2000-2001, with at
least one member employed for 2000-2001, s.t. $2000  w2000  2$2001.
f. : change; HH: Household;$xx: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics - Actual treatment
Treatment Control
2000 2001 2000 2001
N. of HH members 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
Expenditures on food 20016 23976 22374 27462
(9493) (10657) (10490) (12185)
Total net income 75383 93069 89588 105246
(32039) (36758) (31588) (34309)
Total expenditures 78188 92843 83918 98962
(29696) (35777) (34515) (36732)
- with durables 81301 96970 87965 103359
(31789) (42233) (40623) (40706)
Exp. on food as % of
total expenditures
26% 26% 27% 28%
Exp. on food as % of
net income
27% 26% 25% 26%
N. of HH 149 659
N. of treated in HH 1.1 0
N. of control in HH 0.4 1.3
a. Only HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in 2000-2001.
b. For the treatment group the N. of "control" in HH refers to the Narrow and Large control groups.
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Table 6
Actual treatment - Large control group - Panel 2000-2001 - Dummy
Dummy Treatment
Treatment -1385** -1471** -1595** -1573**
(630) (622) (723) (722)
HH income 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.017) (0.018)




Treatment -0.09 -0.11* -0.14* -0.15**
(0.063) (0.061) (0.073) (0.072)
HH income 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.017) (0.018)




Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics No No Yes Yes
Geographical dummies No No Yes Yes
a. Dependent variable is change in food consumption (excluding own production); monthly.
b. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
c. *** [**] (*) denote signiﬁcance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
d. Treatment: N. of HH members employed in the private sector for the whole 2001 s.t.
0.9$2000  w2000  1.1$2001 and0.9$2001  w2001  1.1$2001.
e. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in 2000-2001,
with at least one member employed for the whole 2001, s.t. $2001  w2001  2$2001.
f. : change; HH: Household;$xx: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
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